SUMMARY Nineteen open-fronted (class I) safety cabinets were subjected to spore containment and airflow tests, which suggested that a flow of 0 75 m/s was the minimum required for safe operation; further tests on three of the cabinets were repeated at different air speeds and confirmed this. The airflow is required to overcome the effect of laboratory or external air currents. Contamination of surfaces (including the operator's hands) by aerosols liberated inside the cabinets was investigated and found to depend more on turbulence within the cabinet (as from a restricted front opening) than on the number of air changes. The findings suggest that the product protection provided by a well-designed class I cabinet might equal that of a class II (laminar flow) unit.
SUMMARY Nineteen open-fronted (class I) safety cabinets were subjected to spore containment and airflow tests, which suggested that a flow of 0 75 m/s was the minimum required for safe operation; further tests on three of the cabinets were repeated at different air speeds and confirmed this. The airflow is required to overcome the effect of laboratory or external air currents. Contamination of surfaces (including the operator's hands) by aerosols liberated inside the cabinets was investigated and found to depend more on turbulence within the cabinet (as from a restricted front opening) than on the number of air changes. The findings suggest that the product protection provided by a well-designed class I cabinet might equal that of a class II (laminar flow) unit.
For many years aerosols have been suspected of causing laboratory-acquired infection, and the American Public Health Association Surveys (Pike, 1976) confirmed that up to 85% of such infections are 'silent' and presumptively airborne. Thus the use of a 'safety cabinet' is indicated for work with dangerous pathogens, and by 1909 one existed fitted with a cotton wool inlet filter, rubber gloves, and a 'disinfected' exhaust. Later units, which used a gas burner to provide a draught and incinerate the exhaust, had some success (van den Ende, 1943; Shepard et al., 1945) . Filters were then introduced together with fans able to provide an airflow of approximately 0 25 m/s across the working aperture (Solotorovsky et al., 1953 ). Wedum's (1953) statement that 0&25 m/s air velocity provided adequate containment was refuted by Barbeito and Taylor (1968) , and 05 m/s was specified by Williams and Lidwell (1957) for the Public Health Laboratory Service cabinet. The Porton glove box (Darlow, 1961) had a fan able to provide an air velocity of 0 5 m/s through the glove ports in case of seal failure, or through the alternative 'hand holes'.
Despite such specifications the presence of inadequate but commercially available cabinets (Line, 1972) 
Material and methods
Tests were done on a range of cabinets; some loaned by manufacturers were installed at Papworth, others were in use at laboratories in East Anglia or London. Three Papworth-based units had provision for altering the airflow. Three parameters were studied: containment of microbial aerosols, contamination of interior surfaces, and airflows.
MICROBIAL STUDIES
Microbial studies were based on challenge aerosols of Bacillus subtilis spores (2 x 104) liberated in a 10-second burst from a Bird Micronebuliser (British Oxygen Co) operated at 10 psi (69 kPa). Airflows were measured with an electronic vane anemometer (Airflow Developments RM 27) or a thermoanemometer (Prossor Scientific Instruments), both of which could be attached to a chart recorder. The testsystem has already been described in detail (Newsom, 1974 Spore sprays from outside were done in two cabinets, both with minimal surface contamination in the previous tests. In one case there was a heavy deposition of particles on the plates, and in the other virtually none. Some 9 cm diameter plates were also exposed on the floors of these cabinets and changed hourly during the working day. In one cabinet only 1 particle was recovered from 18 plates, and in the other 18 were recovered from 30 plates.
Effect ofglove ports Table 3 shows that airflows of 0-5 and 1-6m/s through glove ports produced more surface contamination than 0-15 m/s across a fully open front, although the cabinet air changed 11 times/min in the first instance and three times in the second. Table 4 shows that these findings were confirmed by contamination of the author's hand. and its readings tallied well with the microbiology. However, the needle fluctuated considerably when measuring airflows across a working aperture, and so all readings were observed for at least 5 minutes. Figure 2 shows the trace from a cabinet that recirculated exhaust air into the laboratory, set to work at 0-6 m/s. Speeds ranged from 0 4 to 0-7 m/s, although the flow settled to a 10% variation in a quiet room (door and window shut). Figure 3 shows, by contrast, a tracing from a cabinet that exhausted air from the laboratory. Considerable variations are present; and although obvious disturbances, such as working or door slams are to be expected, the reading failed to settle in a quiet room, presumably because of external air pressures, an effect that was exaggerated by leaving the door open. Walking past a cabinet also produces a lowering of airflow, as seen in Figure 4 . Increased airflow through the edge of the working aperture nearest the door was noted with several had been used for tests over six months). There was no contamination of the laboratory air from the blowback nor from shaking the prefilter (which was clean). However, some large infected particles fell from the prefilter onto assay plates on the cabinet floor. In practice, the prefilter or a grid (if provided) may hold a lot of fluff in a very loose manner (Fig. 6 ), which could be readily dislodged.
Discussion
Terjesen and Cherry (1947) challenge-somewhat above the present 10 tests with 2 x 106; however, all of the 'excellent' and probably the 'good' cabinets would be expected to pass the containment specifications. The choice of 2 x 104 spores, however, provided a challenge well above the number of microbes liberated by normal laboratory procedures (Wedum, 1953) except for blending, sonication, or tube shatter during centrifugation. Although 'sterile' sets of tests were a rarity, no doubts were left about inadequate cabinets. The choice of 5 particles/55 1 as a maximum number for room background is below the minimum infectious dose of Coxiella burneti or francisella (Wedum, 1964) . Chatigny and Clinger (1969) (Newsom and Walsingham, 1974) or autoclaving before removal into the laboratory. Finally, and surprisingly, the protection of cabinet surfaces from 'cross contamination' by aerosols generated within it provided by a 'good' or 'excellent' open-fronted exhaust cabinet was equal to that found in a class II cabinet (Newsom, 1979) where the work is continuously flushed by a flow of sterile air; furthermore, in one of the two cabinets tested with a challenge aerosol from the laboratory the 'product protection' (ie, surface contamination) equalled that of a good class II unit. Presumably the aerosols become entrained in the air flowing through the cabinet and are inactivated by impaction on the filter.
The airflow measurements also have implications for cabinet design and installation. Considerable disturbance of the airflow was produced by walking past the cabinet, which should thus be sited in a quiet part of the room. An adequate air supply is needed to allow proper function, and in a small room special provision, for example, louvres in the doors, may be needed. Air-conditioning vents must be avoided, however, as the resultant cross currents may disturb the cabinet airflow (Rake, 1978) .
Blowback can reach quite serious proportions; although a 1 m/s airflow is unlikely to be neutralised, debris may be dislodged from the prefilter when the fan is off. This effect can be reduced by fitting a front sealing panel (night door) to create a block to airflow when the cabinet is not in use, or by providing an anti-blowback valve in the ducting or a suitably shaped exhaust exit. A 'pixie hat' on a flat roof allows wind to pass across from any direction and sometimes produces a venturi suction effect; but air movement up and down walls or sloping roofs can overcome the most carefully designed cowls. Buildup of debris on the pre-filter implies a need for regular changing, for it may reach amounts that can be readily dislodged without affecting the airflow and so be undetectable. Grids (if provided) need to be cleared regularly.
Cabinets that recycled filtered air to the laboratory were less affected by air currents and, of course, immune to blowback, so in this respect they were better than those that exhausted the air outside. However, few laboratories can test filter function on a routine basis; and also fumigant gases must be exhausted from the laboratory, so that the recycling unit is inappropriate for most users.
Occasionally, during aerosol tests from the 2.5 cm position, the spray could be seen entering the laboratory, but no counts were obtained in the slit sampler presumably because the aerosol was immediately sucked back into the cabinet. However, none of the cabinets tested had an aerodynamic front, and 0. M. Lidwell (1978-personal communication has shown that smoke can leak from the floor at the front of some cabinets into the laboratory, and that this effect is minimised by using an aerodynamic 'wing' along the bottom edge of the working aperture. No doubt a 'minimum turbulence' pathway for the air going through the cabinet could be designed allied to the correct size of exhaust filter. Such a unit would, however, have to be practical; a curved floor, for example, would be hard to work with.
The Scientific and Technical Branch of the Department of Health and Social Security maintains a list of these 'good' and 'excellent' cabinets which have an unrestricted working aperture and exhaust outside the laboratory. In the future, hopefully, cabinets will be designed to the British Standard, and the poorer of the models mentioned here will vanish. Meanwhile the user must recall that total safety can be provided only by the glove box since the openfronted unit occasionally may be inactivated by fan failure and provides no protection for the operator's hands, which may well be infected by direct contact with the work. However, the open front is still appropriate for routine work in hospital laboratories where risk and convenience of operation must be balanced out, but disposable gloves and nearby handwashing facilities are essential.
